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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

REGULATION oF SMALL BusINEss -

Ever since the dev~lopment of the guild system the small tradesman
or shopkeeper has attempted in various ways to reduce the number
of his competitors. The time-honored method, in theory at least, has
been to give better service for less money. The more modern method
is to select a delegation from the trade itself whose duty it will be to
proceed to the state capitol, there to urge the passage of "protective
legislation." As a result, legislators have found themselves beseiged
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by lobbyists who show altruistic concern for the health, safety, and
welfare of the general public. Strangely enough, the lawmakers are
told that the public can be adequately protected only by legislation
which in turn protects this particular lobbyist's trade or occupation. In
those instances where these small pressure groups have succeeded, the
protection afforded invariably takes the form of a state board or commission with power to exclude newcomers from entering the field.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the attitude of state
courts toward such legislation and especially to inquire whether the
trend toward this type of petty bureauracy is being curbed by the
judiciary. Minimum attention will be given to laws which are solely
regulatory, nor will supervision incident only to revenue purposes be
considered. The subject may be presented most conveniently by a consideration, first, of the type of factual situation involved in recent legislation and litigation, and secondly, of the constitutional basis upon
which such laws are held valid or invalid by the courts.
I.

Typical of the laws enacted under the circumstances described above
was the bill passed by the Maryland legislature in r935 regulating
paper hangers in Baltimore City/ It created a five-man board with
power to adopt rules and regulations for the examination of paper
hangers and to issue licenses after application, examination and payment of fees. Authority was also given the board to revoke licenses
for any violation of the act or "for any other cause" which it might
"deem sufficient." The purpose apparently was to create a monopoly
by restricting the number of persons who could enter the paper hanging
business. Challenging the act on the ground that it violated the due
process clause of the Maryland 2 and federal 3 constitutions, its opponents carried the case to the Maryland Supreme Court.4 The court
declared the restrictions of the act arbitrary and unreasonable in these
forceful terms:
"there is no possible justification for the regulation of the paper
hanger's trade or vocation, on the ground that such regulation
is necessary to the protection of the public health or safety, any
more than there would be for regulating the business of a carpenter or a bricklayer, or any other harmless and useful calling. It
would, indeed, be impossible to imagine any occupation, no matter
Md. Acts (1935), c. 377.
Md. Declaration of Rights, art. 23.
3 United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment.
4 Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534 (1936); see note in 84 UN1v.
PA. L. REV. 1024 (1936).
1.

2
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how harmless or common, which is not attended. by some danger.
The prick of a needle, the scratch of a pin, a bit of ice on the sidewalk, a misplaced chair, contact with some common electrical
appliance, may cause suffering or death, but such perils are too
remote, and their causes so much a part of everyday life that if
they afforded a basis for regulating the activities of men, the
promise of the right to liberty and the pursuit of happiness held
out by the Constitution would be an ironical mockery. There
must of necessity be somewhere a limit to the right of the state
to regulate the common useful and harmless activities of life,
beyond which the state may not go without destroying those guarantees, and this statute has passed that limit." 5
The photographers of North Carolina, however, were more successful. In State v. Lawrence 6 the state supreme court upheld an act r
establishing a state board of photographic examiners with power to
examine those desiring to practice photography and to license those
who, after payment of fees, should meet the standards established by
the board. Proof was required even as to the moral character of the
applicant. This act was likewise challenged as violative of due process,
but the majority of the North Carolina court, in upholding the act, declared that the legislature was the proper body to determine the instances in which regulation of a business was in the public interest, and
that if the act contained proper standards of classification and was not
arbitrary, due process was accorded. In answering the argument that
the provision in the bill requiring licenses to be issued "to any one
who shall qualify as to competency, ability, and integrity" was an
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the board, the court
simply said, "These are laudable standards. They are not too vague
and indefinite." 8 Interesting, however, was the dissenting opinion of
two justices, which revealed that at least a part of the court realized
the danger involved in such legislation. The principal objection to
laws of this character was expressed in these words by Justice Barnhill:
"The power to exclude men from the ordinary and usual trades
and callings common to all communities is the power to deprive
men of the right to earn an honest livelihood. . . . This is essentially class legislation put forward by a particular group of tradesmen to the end that those now within the trade may limit newcomers seeking to enter the field of their livelihood. . . . the
ld., 170 Md. 251 at 269.
213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586 (1938).
7 N. C. Code (1935), § 7007.
8 State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674 at 680, 197 S. E. 586 (1938).
5

6
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established photographers will be given a virtual monopoly of the
trade and with it such incidentals as the power to control prices
and the character of their services. The 'social interest' which
this law would tend to protect is a very general one, so evanescent
in its characteristics as to belong in the realm of metaphysics and
psychic phenomena." 9
This forceful dissent was cited with approval in Bramley v. State 10
by a Georgia court which refused to uphold an almost exact copy of
the North Carolina Photographers Act. The limits to which such
legislation may go is exemplified by article IV, section ro(b), of the
Georgia act, 11 which provided that when making application for a
license all photographers should submit a certificate from the board of
health showing a negative Wasserman test. In a unanimous opinion
the court declared the act unconstitutional as an unwarranted exercise
of the state police power. To the contention that the statute was needed
to protect the public against fraud the court replied that the average
person has a certain capacity for discovering fraud and avoiding injury
in business transactions, and, in addition, that the already existent
remedies for fraud and misrepresentation afforded adequate relief.12
Cited by the court was the case of Territory v. Kraft 18 wherein the
photographers of Hawaii were defeated in a similar attempt to create
a monopoly.
Eneouraged, perhaps, by the success of the North Carolina photographers, the dry cleaners, dyers and pressers of that state secured in
I937 the passage of legislation designed to protect their trade.1~ The
main features of the act followed a familiar pattern: a board consisting
of five members, three of whom were selected from the trade itself,
with unlimited power and discretion to make its own rules and regulations and to set its own standards as to who should be entitled to a
license and thus admitted to the inner circle. Characteristic of this type
of statute was the absence of any supervision or control over the activities of the board by any responsible branch of the government. No
provision for audit was made except in those instances where items
incidentally affected the state treasury. In other words, while the board
was a creature of the legislature, customary parental authority ceased
Id., 213 N. C. at 683, 684.
187 Ga. 826, 2 S. E. (2d) 647 (1939); see note in 2 GA. B. J. No. 2, p. 41
(1939).
11 Ga. Laws (1937), p. 287.
12 Bramley v. State, 187 Ga. 826, 2 S. E. (2d) 647 (1939).
18 33 Hawaii 397 (1935).
H N. C. Pub. Laws (1937), c. 30, as amended by N. C. Pub. Laws (1939), c.
337.
9

10

786

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

immediately after birth. Despite its decision in State v. Lawrence 15
the Supreme Court of North Carolina in a unanimous opinion 16 declared the act violative of the due process and anti-monopoly clauses
of the North Carolina Constitution. Thus the state which had apparently left the door open for this type of protective class legislation has
now repented and fallen in line· with those courts declaring it to be
man's right to earn a livelihood free from legislative restrictions unrelated in any substantial way to the public welfare.
While the cases just considered represent the most recent opinions
and aptly illustrate the problems involved, it should be noticed that
they by no means exhaust the decisions in this field. Various state courts
have held invalid similar licensing statutes, including those a:ffecting
the rights of horseshoers,17 private surveyors,18 accountants,19 plumbers,20 real estate brokers and salesmen,21 beauty culturists,22 undertakers, 23 insurance brokers,24 barbers,25 cleaners, dyers, and pressers,26
wholesale dealers in farm produce,27 and electricians.28
2.

The constitutional issues raised by the legislation described in the
foregoing section are many and complex. Certain it is that the problem is not merely one of regulation,29 nor is it one of licensing for
15

213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586 (1938).
State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. (2d) 854 (1940).
17
Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334, 62 N. E. 215 (1901); People v. Beattie, 96
App. Div. 383, 89 N. Y. S. 193 (1904); In re Aubrey, 36 Wash. 308, 78 P. 900
(1904).
18
Doe v. Jones, 327 Ill. 387, 158 N. E. 703 (1927).
19
Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253, 150 N. E. 696 (1926); annotation, 43
A. L. R. 1086 at 1095 (1926).
20
Replogle v. City of Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 267 S. W. 353 (1924).
21
Rawles v. Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287, 279 S. W. 350 (1926).
22
Hoff v. State, (Del. 1938) 197 A. 75•
28
People v. Ringe, 197 N. Y. 143, 90 N. E. 451 (1910).
24
Chicagoland Agencies v. Palmer, 364 Ill. 13, 2 N. E. (2d) 910 (1936).
25
Schneider v. Duer, 170 Md. 326, 184 A. 914 (1936).
26
Becker v. State, 7 W.W. Harr. (37 Del.) 454, 185 A. 92 (1936). However,
in Robinson v. Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board, 141 Fla. 899, 194 So.
269 ( I 940), the court upheld an act establishing a commission with broad powers to
license cleaners, pressers, dyers and launderers.
21
State v. Chisesi, 187 La. 675, 175 So. 453 (1937).
28
Holding invalid a municipal ordinance, Richardson v. Coker, 188 Ga. 170,
3 S. E. (2d) 636 (1939).
29 "It will simplify discussion if we bear in mind that the controversy in this case
does not concern the propriety of minor regulations of business and occupations which
may be, and are, imposed generally on the principle sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, or to the still broader field of regulation under the police power which does not
involve the question of exclusion from the business, trade, or occupation made the
16

COMMENTS

revenue purposes where the sole purpose of the license is to obtain a
fee. 80 Rather, the problem involves the right of a state to say to an
individual, "You shall not pursue your harmless and worthwhile calling until you have passed an examination conducted by other businessmen already engaged in that field."
It is of course recognized that there are some instances where the
safety and health of the general public demand that those practicing
certain trades or professions be licensed. Thus, lawyers, doctors, and
others engaged in occupations requiring a special degree of technical
knowledge or skill must prove their proficiency by examination before
offering their services to the public.st Likewise, it is generally conceded
that barbers 32 and plumbers 88 are engaged in a trade which might be
injurious to the public health unless proper regulation is maintained.
But beyond this field regulation should not go,8 and some courts have
not been hesitant in denouncing legislation enacted on the flimsy excuse
that the public needs protection against the fraud and graft of uncontrolled business. In declaring unconstitutional a law requiring real
4,

subject of regulation. There is a great body of decision upon that subject altogether
too general for satisfactory application to the question before us." State v. Harris, 216
N. C. 746 at 755, 6 S. E. (2d} 854 (1940).
80
"A license may be issued as an aid to regulation under the police power, or it
may be for revenue, and in both aspects it is the exercise of a governmental function."
Page v. Regents of University System of Georgia, (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) 93 F. (2d)
887 at 893. See also Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534 (1936).
81
State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. (2d) 854 (1940). As to the licensing
of lawyers, see In re Applicants for License to Practice Law, 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E.
635 (1906); annotation, IO L. R. A. (N. S.) 288 (1907); Creditors' Service Corp.
v. Cummings, 57 R. I. 291, 190 A. 2 (1937). As to the licensing of doctors, see
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Fife, l 62 La. 681, II 1 So. 58,
54 A. L. R. -594 at 600 (1926), affirmed Fife v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners, 274 U. S. 720, 47 S. Ct. 590 (1927).
82
Ex parte Herrin, (Okla. 1939) 93 P. (2d) 21; contra, Timmons v. Morris,
(D. C. Wash. 1921) 271 F. 721. In State v. Paille, (N. H. 1939) 9 A. (2d) 663,
a municipal ordinance which limited the hours during which barber shops could stay
open was held invalid.
88
People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden of City Prison, 144 N. Y. 529, 39 N. E.
686 (1895); State v. Stark, 100 Mont. 365, 52 P. (2d) 890 (1935). Contra,
Replogle v. City of Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 267 S. W. 353 (1924). See Hanft and
Hamrick, "Haphazard Regimentation under Licensing Statutes," 17 N. C. L. REv. I
(1938), for a comprehensive survey of other trades and callings subjected to licensing
under the police power.
H "But the power to require that the work of the plumber's craft, or that of
any other avocation which men have the common and natural right to pursue, shall be
conducted in such manner as not to endanger the public health or safety is one thing,
while the power to prohibit individuals from engaging in such handicrafts and occupations is entirely another and different thing." Replogle v. City of Little Rock, 166 Ark.
617 at 630, 267 S. W. 353 (1924).
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estate brokers and salesmen to prove their moral fitness before obtaining a license the Kentucky Court of Appeals said:
"If occasional opportunity for fraud is to be the test, then there
is no reason why every grocer, every merchant, every automobile
dealer, every keeper of a garage, every manufacturer, and every
mechanic who deals more frequently with the public in general,
and whose opportunities for fraud are far greater than those of
the real estate agent or salesman, may not be put on the same
basis. If that be done then only those who, in the opinion of certain boards or the courts, have the necessary moral qualifications
will be permitted to engage in the ordinary occupations of life.
The result will be that all others who fail to establish their moral
fitness will not only be deprived of their means of livelihood, but
will become a burden either on their families and friends or the
community at large. In our opinion, the right to earn one's daily
bread cannot be made to hang on so narrow a thread. Broad as is
the police power its limit is exceeded when the state undertakes
to require moral qualifications of one who wishes to engage or
·continue in a business which as usually conducted is no more dangerous to the public than any other ordinary occupation of life." 35
Admitting, then, that in some instances regulation may be a valid
exercise of the police power, it is clear that where regulation amounts
to prohibition of a harmless business the due process clauses of the
federal and of state constitutions should afford protection. 86 The holding has been general that property, within the meaning of these constitutional guarantees, "includes the right to engage in those common
occupations or callings which involve no threat to the public welfare,
to exercise a choice in the selection of an occupation, and to pursue that
occupation" so long as there is no interference with the rights of others. 87
Laws designed to curb competition by placing in the hands of a chosen
few arbitrary and unlimited power to exclude newcomers from entering
that particular field amount not only to a delegation of legislative
authority but also to a deprivation of a most valuable property right.
It is conceivable that some possible basis might be found for regulating
the activities of paper hangers and photographers,38 but to foster
monopoly by limiting the number who may enter the field is governRawles v. Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287 at 292, 279 S. W. 350 (1926).
State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. (2d) 854 (1940). It is generally
conceded that those businesses which are nuisances or may become nuisances may be
prohibited without denial of due process of law. See 16 C. J. S. 1432 (1939).
37 Dasch v. Jackson," 170 Md. 251 at 263-264, 183 A. 534 (1936).
88 Use of inflammable or poisonous chemicals might warrant some supervision. It
has been suggested that because paper hangers often remove and replace electrical fixtures they should be required to know something of the properties of electricity.
35
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mental interference with private business at its worst. Fortunately, the
trend is toward a realization of this viewpoint. The re-emphasis placed
upon the rights of the individual by the Supreme Court of the United
States in some of its recent decisions 89 finds its counterpart in the apparent determination of state courts to hold in check any unwarranted
extension of the state police power. In the Harris case the court used
these significant words:
"There is nothing in government more dangerous to the liberty
and rights of the individual than a too ready resort to the police
power. . .. Resort to the police power to exclude persons from an
ordinary calling, finding justification only by the existence of a
vague public interest, often amounting to no more than a doubtful
social convenience, is collectivistic in principle, destructive to the
historic values of these guaranties, and contrary to the genius of
of the people who did all that was humanly possible to secure them
in a written constitution." 40
But while the trend may be in the direction of a narrowing of the
police power and consequent widening of the protection afforded by
the state and federal constitutions, the problem is still unsettled. Despite the decisions of the United States Supreme Court mentioned
above, certain other cases decided by that tribunal indicate a reluctance
on its part to interfere where state legislatures have thought economic
control of some sort was necessary, even though such control might
violate due process as interpreted, at least, by the North Carolina
court.41 Whether the federal judiciary, as well as other state courts,
would sustain legislation which went as far as that declared void in
the Harris case, however, is doubtful." 2 The gap between regulation
according to prescribed standards and outright prohibition as repre89

As illustrated by Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S.
496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939) (freedom of speech and of assembly); Schneider v. New
Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 146 (1939) (freedom of speech); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940) (freedom of speech and peaceful
picketing).
40
State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746 at 763, 6 S. E. (2d) 854 (1940). For a like
warning of the dangers of an increasing extension of the police power, see Territory
v. Kraft, 33 Hawaii 397 (1935).
41
For example, in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 at 537, 54 S. Ct. 505
(1934), it was said, "So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in
the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that
policy by legislation adapted to its purpose."
42
Certain monopolistic features of the New York Milk Control Act of 1934,
2B N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1938), §§ 253 ff., were declared invalid in
May-Flower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 266, 56 S. Ct. 457 (1936).
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sented by unlimited power in a few to set any basis for exclusion they
may see fit, is so great that cases in one field are no reliable indication
of probable decisions in the other. But in view of this somewhat divergent attitude taken by the Supreme Court the opponents of monopolistic legislation might well regard the state courts as more receptive
to their arguments. No jurisdictional question arises, because whether
the laws are alleged to be invalid under the state constitution or under
the federal constitution, or under both, the state court has power to
consider the problem.
Alfred G. Ellick, Jr.

